Herman Melville's Navigational Aesthetic[1]

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IN 2010, a television commercial for AT&T and Blackberry brags that the Blackberry Torch smartphone can "tell a whole new story" by its retelling of an older one: Herman Melville's *Moby-Dick; or, The Whale* (1851).[2] What is new about the story—and we presume about the phone—is how Blackberry's suite of applications can handle an evocative recasting of Melville's encyclopedic novel into what the ad's post-producers call a "transmedia approach."[3] By portraying the voyage of the *Pequod* through email clients, mapping applications, social networks, and a flip-ebook, the advertisement shows that this device can help its user efficiently manage her own narrative. The Torch is the guiding light—pun very much intended—that allows its users to orient themselves in the digitally mediated and capitalist world-system, a similar world-system to the one that fostered the *Pequod*'s financial *raison d'être*. *Moby-Dick*—which T. Hugh Crawford has called "Melville's great network novel"—stands in for AT&T's tagline, "Rethink Possible," on a global wireless network that has greatly impacted the distinctions between work, passion, and rest.[4] More broadly, this remediation of *Moby-Dick* stages a historical replacement of the network for the sea, what Christopher Connery has termed "capitalism's primary myth element."[5] Thus, besides the physical dissonance between 573-page book and one-minute transmedia experience, *Moby-Dick* seems a curious choice as a beacon to orient smartphone users because of its manipulations of rational navigation and cartography that undergird capitalist circulation on the sea and on the network.

This essay argues that in *Moby-Dick* and the late fictions that follow, Melville maps an aesthetic that values circumambulation over the violence of enclosure foregrounded in purposeful narration. This mode of narrative navigation, Melville's navigational aesthetic, refuses plot and destination by privileging sensation and experience. Rather than providing a model for readers to position their narratives comfortably within the networks of global capital, Melville's fiction actively challenges the rational signposts of orientation and replaces them with a mode of disorientation based on decay and proprioception. In Melville's late fiction, proprioception—a mode of orientation defined by one's attunement to the sensation of one's own movements—undergirds a metaphysics motivated by a dynamic decay rather than a static plasticity. This metaphysics attends as much to humans, living or dead, as it does to objects that are kept and that are discarded. Besides reconfiguring nineteenth-century accounts of metaphysical and rational orientation, Melville's navigational aesthetic opens up inquiries into the role of extraneous, ignored, and discarded matter in shaping an imaginative cartography that counters capitalism's efficiency in the mid-nineteenth century and in the digital era.

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In the first chapter of *Moby-Dick*, Ishmael acclimates his readers to a unique mode of movement and sensory orientation. Ishmael's first daydream may be of the "watery part of the world," but his first narrative walkabout directs readers on a peculiar tour of lower Manhattan: "Circumambulate the city of a dreamy Sabbath afternoon. Go from Corlears Hook to Coenties Slip, and from thence, by Whitehall, northward. What do you see?"[6] In the novel's first of many detours, Ishmael draws our attention to men "fixed" in place looking northward, imagining "ocean reveries." Ishmael's commands, however, make ambiguous who or what moves these static men from within the city to its landed limits. The ambiguity extends to whether Ishmael seeks to command the static men or his second-person reader. Ishmael directs both in mode ("circumambulate") and in vision ("But look!"). Yet, "the streets take you waterward," a grammar that makes an object of "you," while lending agency to "the streets" (*MD* 3). At the Manhattan section's conclusion, Ishmael wonders "does the magnetic virtue of the needles of the compasses of all those ships attract them thither?" (*MD* 4). Ishmael's query suggests that the ships moving along the shore draw the men to that shore ("thither") so that the men can be used as an alternative reference for north.

How can we navigate when magnetic orientation is repelled, when our compasses orient us and are oriented by our bodies? What is navigation without the stability of true north? The shuttling between object and agent, as well as magnetism and human orientation in this passage, serve as the benchmarks of navigation. Ishmael engages these navigational movements to support a larger point: Americans, released "absent-minded" and dreaming will move unthinkingly to water. Rendered into automata, Americans are compelled to action by a varied set of forces—the command of another, the topographical downslope of Manhattan's coast, the city's streets, a geological magnetism, and a human magnetism. One connection reigns supreme and everyone, including the static men and "you" knows it: "meditation and water are wedded for ever" (*MD* 4). Deeply-rooted geologic principles, like "north," are no match for this matrimony; the men positioned northward along the shore repel the compass needle on the ships instead of attracting the needle as true north would. What is the orienting force that pulls Manhattanites and "you" to the sea? Is it the water? The constantly moving ships? Manhattan's street grid? The reveries? This detour through lower Manhattan establishes a melting and fluid sense of agency and sensory influence, one that can be understood as a metonym for the competing psychic and affective assemblages in Melville's novels.

A wide array of critics point to Melville's late fiction for its asymptotic penchant for disorienting staid nineteenth-century taxonomies that otherwise organize and make sense of the world. Robert T. Tally Jr. suggests that Melville channeled his "obsession with the truth, discovering it and representing it" by making his writing a cartographic mark that filled in otherwise unmapped locales in the Pacific.[7] Denise Tanyol locates this desire for truth in Melville's skepticism for Darwin's naturalist classifications on the Galapagos Islands. By challenging the "subjectivity—and ultimately the self-interest underlying any ostensibly objective scientific system of classification," Melville made a cultural and political claim.[8] Darwin's limited focus on the plant and animal life on the islands lead him to neglect to mention any indigenous peoples. This neglect marked the islands as empty and therefore ripe for colonizing: to undercut the objectivity of Darwin's knowledge is to undercut a colonial fantasy. According to William V. Spanos, Melville's tendency to undermine taxonomical paradigms leads to its

perennial errancy, a phenomenon that allows *Moby-Dick* to wax and wane between opposed ideologies.[9] Tally, Tanyol, and Spanos show that "truth" for Melville doesn't reside in stable taxonomies. Melville's narrative science cuts a sharper figure with its deliberate opacity, an intentional bending of Enlightenment light.

Melville refigures these taxonomies by revising Immanuel Kant's metaphor for calibrating rational thought. Melville may not have had contact with "What Is Orientation in Thinking?" (1786), where Kant's metaphor appears, but by 1849 he was at least familiar with Kant via his conversations with George J. Adler, a German-American scholar.[10] The final sketch of "The Encantadas" (1854), a text that draws on Melville's experience on the Galapagos Islands, concludes with "a stake and bottle," which is used to mark the transit of post, and therefore, the "known" location of the Enchanted Islands.[11] Instead of holding firm as a cartographic beacon, this stake "rots and falls, presenting no very exhilarating object."[12] It is this "rotting" signpost that challenges the static orderings of Kantian rationality. In "What Is Orientation in Thinking," Kant draws a parallel between reason and the affectively embodied orientation between left and right. This embodied orientation requires an internal "feeling" between left and right, as much as it requires an external observation, say of the sunrise on the horizon. Kant argues that the difference between left and right is a feeling because there is "no perceptible difference" between the two sides of the body.[13] Because the distinction between left and right is formed by external sensory observations and internal feelings working in concert, Kant claims that geographical orientation operates via a "*subjective* distinction." If external observations can't be made, however, Kant posits that reason provides for their absence. Beyond enclosing the limitless bounds of thought, Kant describes how rational beliefs operate:

> the signpost or compass by means of which the speculative thinker can orient himself on his rational wanderings in the field of supra-sensory objects, while the man of ordinary but (morally) healthy reason can use it to plan his course, for both theoretical and practical purposes, in complete conformity with the whole end of his destiny.[14]

The rational beliefs organized by the signpost of reason make possible the recognition of one's own thoughts as such by providing a point of reference in the "field of supra-sensory objects." Without this signpost, then, certain modes of thought cannot be positioned and therefore reside somewhere off the map without being known. The disintegrating postal stake and bottle on the edge of the Enchanted Islands challenges this metaphor for rationality and, in turn, interrogates rational orientation itself.

Melville's revision of rational orientation wagers that the signpost will not only disappear, but is subject to material decay over time. Kant's post only calibrates orientation because of its guise of stability. When that stability breaks down—as the rot does for Melville's post—the positioning apparatus loses its exceptionality; what was once an essential beacon becomes "no very exhilarating object," an arbitrary marker. By acknowledging that the post rots, Melville emphasizes that decay itself is an essential part of the orientation process. The unceasing eversion of the post, of the interred remains of soldiers on the island, and of the concepts mobilized by the post and the body become part of the landscape, part of the "background" they inhabit. This egalitarian eversion allows us to acknowledge that the post or the body

was foregrounded in the first place, and that now it has become merely refuse, a "mound" that serves as a table for "good-natured seamen" to "quaff a friendly can to the poor soul's repose."[15] Melville replaces a stable post with a post that becomes a mound, material becoming different material through decay. This becoming may be much less intuitive to orient movement and position, but nevertheless serves as Melville's impetus for navigation and the organization of sensation. This orientation to decay and movement and its resultant sensory attunement defines Melville's aesthetic.

Melville's navigational aesthetic takes proprioception as its principle. For Brian Massumi, proprioception, the sense of movement of one's own body, "most directly registers ... displacements of the parts of the body relative to each other."[16] Rather than focusing on a visual post, proprioception attends to the sensate distinction Kant passes over between left and right within one's own body. Orientation grows to be "more like a tropism ... than a cognition" when movement through space is registered by the sensory twists and turns of a trip, not a checklist of visual landmarks.[17] Massumi asserts that we orient ourselves not by where we are in space, but rather by the way we move. By adding decay to the mix, Melville's post shows that a recognition of our past and future lives as different matter is an integral part of this sensory attunement. That which is a person today will be a "mound" tomorrow and recognizing as much, for Melville, changes the relation between the borders of human and animal, background and foreground, and character and setting. Melville's navigational aesthetic does not invert these hierarchies, but rather actively experiments with the sensory dynamics of their decay.

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Rather than functioning as the passive scene in which the narrative takes place, Melville's backgrounds—composed of what might be otherwise understood as the unimportant—shape the movements of his novels' titular figures. *Pierre; or, The Ambiguities* (1852) presents an exemplary case for how the setting itself affects the movement of the novel's protagonist. Additionally, the novel's markedly different backgrounds, which range from gothic-pastoral Saddle Meadows to urban New York City, command a reader's attention to their construction.

In composing backgrounds that call attention to their own construction, Melville engages with contemporaneous developments in landscape design and aesthetics, primarily "the picturesque." Melville's familiarity with the picturesque likely came from John Ruskin's five volume *Modern Painters*, which argues that the late work of J. M. W. Turner truthfully represents the violent swells and turns of nature through his particular attention to painterly details.[18] Through their constructedness, the painterly details draw the viewer into the swell of forces "continually taking place," rather than distracting the viewer from the representation of nature.[19] These otherwise distracting details allow viewers to enter the landscape more fully. For Ruskin, Turner's paintings are "fitted for our habitation" as observers: viewers inhabit these landscapes, themselves becoming part of the swelling and swirling of nature.[20] In "On Picturesque Beauty" (1794), William Gilpin calls attention to how nature becomes beautiful only through its human shaping:

> . . . why does an elegant piece of garden ground make no figure on canvas? The shape is pleasing; the combination of the objects, harmonious; and the widening of the walk in the very line of beauty. All this is true; but the *smoothness* of the

> whole, tho right, and as it should be in nature, offends in picture. Turn the lawn into a piece of broken ground: plant rugged oaks instead of flowering shrubs: break the edges of the walk: give it the rudeness of a road; mark it with wheel-tracks; and scatter around a few stones and brushwood; in a word, instead of making the whole *smooth*, make it *rough*; and you make it also *picturesque*.[21]

Though the picturesque is said to be a return to the rough contours of nature, Gilpin's description is no more "natural" than carving a line of beauty through an open lawn. The verbs in his description belie the human influence in making the smooth wild; "turn," "plant," "break," "give," "mark," and "scatter" are all verbs that compel an actor to perform them, just like Ishmael's early imperatives to his readers in *Moby-Dick*. The landscape demands a viewer's attention to the actions that made it appear static and, in turn, draws viewers into the sensory forces of matter in motion, forcing those viewers to become part of that motion themselves.

With *Pierre*, Melville represents this line of descent into the swirling forces of his characters into the background and the background into the characters. Pierre, the novel's protagonist, departs for New York City from the pastoral Saddle Meadows to evade a broken engagement with Lucy Tartan. Upon arriving in the city, Pierre feels "unworthy pangs" for his new fiancée Isabel, who Pierre learns is his long-lost sister.[22] To alleviate these pangs, Pierre finds "some relief in making his regular evening walk through the greatest thoroughfare of the city; that so, the utter isolation of his soul, might feel itself the more intensely from the incessant jogglings of his body against the bodies of the hurrying thousands" (*P* 340). These walks, which turn Pierre's body into a "fiery furnace," are Pierre's effort to ignite his soul through random contact with anonymous bodies. Despite the flâneur-esque escape of these walks, Pierre eventually walks himself into a gutter where he cannot see. There he loses "any ordinary life feeling at all" or any sense of himself (*P* 341). What results is a "blindness," a "vertigo," and the dance of a "million green meteors" (*P* 341). This disorientation of self results from a navigation through urban landscapes that Pierre recognizes as roughness constructed, the implied secret of natural beauty in the picturesque.

An earlier walk in *Pierre* shows how Pierre's ambles are determined by his surroundings and how that mutual determination leads to the decay of the landscape and Pierre. This walk opens with Pierre observing the "higher brick colonnades connecting the ancient building with the modern" (*P* 289). As he observes, Pierre and the narrator are interrupted by the approach of Plotinus Plinlimmon, the author of a pamphlet on "Chronometricals and Horologicals." On his journey from Saddle Meadows, Pierre finds this pamphlet in his pocket only to lose it shortly thereafter.[23] When Pierre returns the pamphlet to his pocket, the pamphlet somehow works its way into the fabric of Pierre's clothing, "So that all the time he was hunting for this pamphlet, he himself was wearing the pamphlet" (*P* 294). Facing Plinlimmon brings about this revelation and, in recognizing that the pamphlet was with Pierre all along, the narrator foregrounds a redrafting of the background. The encounter with Plinlimmon on this walk is actually an encounter with the lost, though ever-present, text and the encounter further suggests that Pierre himself might just be a text that can organize and make visible the swells of the background. The content of "Chronometricals and Horologicals" and the fact that Pierre only holds a fragment of the pamphlet is important for understanding the

fluid metaphysics of this moment. Pierre's fragment of Plinlimmon's pamphlet argues that religious reflection establishes a relation between the scale of man (horologicals) and the scale of the celestial (chronometricals). Though it remains irresolvable to Pierre, critic D. Graham Burnett has pointed out that making horologicals and chronometricals correspond is a "simple matter of geometry," made possible by John Harrison's marine chronometer.[24] In some regard, the encounter with Plinlimmon becomes a sensory staging of the deviations from standard time measured by the chronometer. The matter of characters and background torques with the shifts in time; what had been a buzzing urban backdrop fades into darkness when Pierre brushes against Plinlimmon in a mute "brick corridor" (*P* 294).

Pierre's encounter with Plinlimmon shows Melville's navigational aesthetic in action, a representative approach that attends to the affective network of possibility from a set of actants. By allowing characters to melt into background and vice versa, Melville shows that depth in text—and in picturesque painting for that matter—is an illusion. Landscape in text reveals itself to be roughness constructed out in the open. Michael D. Snediker has observed that the darkness surrounding Pierre heightens the sense of Pierre as text. For Snediker part of the challenge of *Pierre* is how it pushes against the ways that objects, characters, and landscapes inside of a text do or do not "conform to rules more readily applicable to the immanent, non-textual world" by putting before readers a text that questions its own boundaries.[25] By allowing the force of the text's boundaries to participate in the forces of the novel's narrative and figurative engine, *Pierre* shows that the navigational aesthetic presents meaning as a horizon, rather than a depth to be plunged. The narrator stages a horizon of meaning by an attention to surface. The horizon, however, is not a singular destination to be reached, but an entirely different assemblage of itinerant forces, "surface stratified on surface ... the world being nothing but superinduced superficies" (*P* 285). After Pierre's encounter with Plinlimmon, the narrator asks the reader:

> Could he [Pierre] likewise have carried about with him in his mind the thorough understanding of the book, and yet not be aware that he so understood it? . . . And here it may be randomly suggested, by way of bagatelle, whether some things that men think they do not know, are not for all that thoroughly comprehended by them; and yet, so to speak, though contained in themselves, are kept a secret from themselves? (*P* 294)

On the one hand, the narrator could be speaking of death in the passage above. In the frame of the navigational aesthetic, on the other hand, the narrator suggests that what is present is never quite seen, despite the figuration of presence as understanding. By attending to the distracted sensation of lost people and things of the background, the narrator wagers that all surfaces are superficial in that if those surfaces are paid any attention, they, too, can be sensed and perceived. In *Pierre* a search for depth merely manifests absence; "min[ing] into the pyramid" and coming to the "central room," "we lift the lid—and no body is there!—appallingly vacant as vast is the soul of a man" (*P* 285).

Locating absence while seeking depth—the vacant soul of man—may suggest a privileging of that absence, rather than an attention to the dynamic shifts in background and foreground. Yet, if we return to the decaying post from "The Encantadas," we can see how this absence points to the shifting hierarchizations of foreground to background and back again—a dynamic pattern

between attention and distraction—instead of a deconstructive undoing of text. In "The Encantadas" the post doesn't dissolve into nothingness, but becomes different matter through organic processes. The rotting stake shifts from a pole that orients to organic matter that doesn't, just like the shifting orientations of the war machine described by Deleuze and Guattari. To put it simply, "the very conditions that make the State or World war machine possible … continually recreate unexpected possibilities for counterattack."[26] The war machine, in other words, can be turned against itself in the same way that a stable pole for orientation can become unstable matter complicating orientation. Of course the war machine itself operates as a metaphor, "an 'ideological,' scientific, or artistic movement can be a potential war machine."[27] In "Bartleby; or, The Formula" Deleuze reads Melville's work as an "affirmation of a world in *process*."[28] For Deleuze, this affirmation of process in Melville's fiction intervenes in formulations of a pragmatic, political community. In depicting the possibilities for counterattack, Melville preserves the force of the collective enunciation of the American Revolution, despite the lasting hypocritical turns of American anti-democracy. When we lift the lid of the sarcophagus in *Pierre* what is revealed is the process of becoming between a depth that can serve a warring hegemony and an assemblage of surfaces that can challenge the surface-depth regime by using the resources of that regime.

Rather than an emptiness or even a center in Melville's navigational aesthetic, there is the remnant of a revolutionary politics circuited through the dynamic decay between distraction and attention. In *Pierre* this remnant is the forgotten pamphlet stitched into a pocket, a pamphlet that can open up the virtual force locked between the chronometrical and horological orientations. Just as Deleuze has seen the foundlings of pragmatism in Melville's manipulations of transcendentalism, Brian Massumi sees the body as "pragmatic" when the body "*enters* the relations and tweaks" what the brain calibrates through the process of sensation.[29] Attending to the movement of the body and its proprioceptive sense blurs the boundaries between binaries of abstract and concrete, subjective and objective. For Massumi, this attention to movement has an immediate payoff for virtual methods of architectural design, suggesting that their abstract representations of space are in fact much more concrete than they seem. For Melville, the navigational aesthetic can reconfigure definitions of political and philosophical pragmatism. Stanley Cavell has written extensively on how the ethics of Emerson's transcendentalism resist the reduction of everyday experience into instrumental reason in the philosophies of William James and John Dewey. Dewey, for instance, takes pragmatism as a rational science in which the scientific method "is the only authentic means … for getting at the significance of our everyday experience."[30] Melville would anachronistically assert that it is movement—not rationality—that can get at the significance of everyday experience. This emphasis on movement shifts the emphasis of a pragmatism driven by rationality. Melville changes *common-sense*, which is forced *common* knowledge that unites one's senses, to *sense*, which forms a commons around a shared contingency of the senses to one's surroundings. By reorienting pragmatism in this way, Melville's navigational aesthetic shows how human consciousness determines what is natural, what is privileged and important, and how those privileges are determined by movement. Melville's figures impose their own imaginary cartography atop these instruments; in other words, an assemblage of ideas, sensations, and systems of politics, of representations, and of humanism coincide to characterize an orientation. Those abstract, though pragmatic orientations create the sense of imperative attention, as they do the annals of distraction.

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Pairing *Moby-Dick* and Melville's navigational aesthetic with a cellular phone advertisement brings out an important intervention in inquiries into distraction. Recently Paul North has argued that the current popular sense of distraction has a thin philosophical etymology. Distraction has turned temporal; it is about the shortened length of attention, about juggling a multiplicity of tasks half-hearted and all at once. While North points to Jonathan Crary's assertion that distraction is just another form of attention, North is more interested in a derivation from Aristotle. Aristotle suggests that distraction is "periodic non-thought," a moment entirely absent of anything resembling attention with spans short or long.[31] North puts it bluntly: "Where philosophy, criticism, and art theory are traditionally concerned with principles for the formation of things, distraction is concerned with their deformation, disintegration, and ceasing to be. It posits a tendency toward not-thinking and a release from being."[32] My assertion has been that Melville's navigational aesthetic formulates an orientation towards proprioception, the constant becoming between one pole and another. This becoming most frequently presents in Melville's late-fiction as distraction or digression, an energy-induced turn to yet another surface stratified upon surface. Thus, how does this distraction, this "pragmatic" orientation dial into, or out of, the networks of global capitalism? How does it represent the sea as Western capitalism's myth element as the repository for a counterattack? From the perspective of Melville's navigational aesthetic, the distracted narrative of *Moby-Dick* seems the perfect data for the smartphone, the distraction device du jour. The choice to make *Moby-Dick* "tell a whole new story" wrenches open a space for capitalist critique—a space of escape—by acknowledging an inversion of capitalism's current myth element, the network. Strangely enough, the Blackberry and AT&T advertisement yields an actual calling to "Rethink Possible."

Orienting to non-thought creates a very different sense of distraction than that which has otherwise been used to consider how people interact with media. For Pierre, who encounters a human form of his distraction medium in Plinlimmon, the background quite literally dematerializes, but then returns in a wrenching blankness. A space is carved not for a release from being, but a radical becoming. This becoming occurs in a moment of lost consciousness, a moment when Pierre requires rest from the jogglings of Manhattan, even if that rests comes from falling into a ditch. In *24/7* Jonathan Crary argues that the cardinal direction of late capital is the "incompatibility of anything resembling reverie with the priorities of efficiency, functionality, and speed."[33] There are fewer and fewer moments where attention need not be directed. Just as Pierre makes contact with bodies, things, and buildings in the city, walkers staring at a smartphone contend with the virtual, networked contact with other people, commodities, and commerce. Those walkers end up in the saturated media-verse, distracted from their own walking. For Crary, to shut off a device after one's complete immersion in the media of distraction, however, opens up an "inevitably brief interval *before* the world fully recomposes itself into its unthought and unseen familiarity. It is an instant of disorientation, when one's immediate surroundings . . . seem both vague and oppressive in their time-worn materiality."[34] When Pierre awakens in a ditch after losing "any ordinary life-feeling at all," he finds himself "dabbled with mud and slime" (*P* 341). Mud and slime might eventually cover Pierre when he is buried after his death; it is the soil that accelerates his dematerialization. In

the purposive-less thought, a different, fleeting, and delayed sensorium emerges for Pierre before orientation sets in again: he sees the molecular movement of a "million green meteors danc[ing]," and the morbid movement that animates his orientation.

Melville's navigational aesthetic presents a mode of non-active resistance that ceases to move through an attentive distraction. Further, Melville's navigational aesthetic shows that it is only through an attentiveness to distraction, an attunement to particularly live sensory inputs and forces that the possibility for non-thought emerges in art. In the moment of coming to, the constructedness of one's self emerges if only for the blink of an eye. In this moment Pierre, like the Manhattanites in *Moby-Dick*, is not idle at all; the Manhattanites are pragmatic, but not present—they are outside of the network, albeit briefly, oriented to the very type of thought that even philosophy can't engage: non-thought. Crary suggests that sleep and rest become a mundane way to perform "radical interruption," a daily rehearsal for renewal outside the bounds of capitalism.[35] Melville's orientation to distraction suggests that an arrest, a ceasing of movement, can become just that type of rest. By doing so the network might be able to form a community, one cultivated by dissolving the post of rationality and remapping its sediment, a radical cartographic act that shows how motion might be mapped together, pragmatic and abstract, all at once.

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NOTES

[1] This essay would have been a mere "ocean reverie" without the insight and encouragement from Colin Dayan and Scott Juengel and the later readings by Keegan Cook Finberg, Stephen Pasqualina, and the two anonymous reviewers at *ELN*.

[2] AT&T and Blackberry. "Moby Dick." Television Advertisement. BBDO, 2010. massmarket.tv/work/all/walker-moby-dick/.

[3] "MassMarket >> Walker – Moby Dick." *MassMarket,* massmarket.tv/work/all/walker-moby-dick/.

[4] T. Hugh Crawford, "Networking the (Non) Human: Moby-Dick, Matthew Fontaine Maury, and Bruno Latour," *Configurations* 5, no. 1 (1997): 7. doi:10.1353/con.1997.0003.

[5] With remediation, I invoke Jay David Bolter and Richard A. Grusin's definition of the term, "the representation of one medium in another." Jay David Bolter and Richard A. Grusin, *Remediation: Understanding New Media* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), 45. Christopher Connery, "Sea Power," *PMLA* 125, no. 3 (May 2010): 686. doi:10.1632/pmla.2010.125.3.685. Connery's assertion has become a rallying cry for the emerging field of Ocean Studies. For more on Oceanic Studies and its relationship to navigation see, "Oceanic Studies," *PMLA* 125, no. 3 (May 2010): 657–736.

[6] Herman Melville, *Moby-Dick; or, The Whale*, eds. Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001), 4. Hereafter cited in text as *MD*.

[7] Robert T. Tally Jr., "'Spaces That Before Were Blank': Truth and Narrative Form in Melville's South Seas Cartography," *Pacific Coast Philology* 42, no. 2 (January 2007): 181.

[8] Denise Tanyol, "The Alternative Taxonomies of Melville's 'The Encantadas,'" *The New England Quarterly* 80, no. 2 (June 2007): 263.

[9] William V. Spanos, *The Errant Art of Moby-Dick: The Canon, the Cold War, and the Struggle for American Studies* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995).

[10] Merton M. Sealts, *Melville's Reading* (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1988), 53.

[11] Herman Melville, "The Encantadas," in *The Piazza Tales*, eds. Harrison Hayford, Alma A. MacDougal, G. Thomas Tanselle, et al. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1996), 172.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Immanuel Kant, "What Is Orientation in Thinking?" in *Kant: Political Writings*, trans. H.B. Nisbet (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 238.

[14] Ibid., 245.

[15] Melville, "The Encantadas," 173.

[16] Brian Massumi, *Parables of the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 179.

[17] Ibid., 180.

[18] Sealts, *Melville's Reading*, 430.

[19] John Ruskin, *The Works of John Ruskin: Modern Painters*, Vols. 1–5 (J. Wiley, 1890), 179.

[20] Ibid.

[21] William Gilpin, *Three Essays: On Picturesque Beauty; on Picturesque Travel; and on Sketching Landscape: To Which Is Added a Poem, on Landscape Painting* (printed for R. Blamire, 1792), 7–8. For more on the picturesque and its relationship to "order" and subjectivity see, Ron Broglio, *Technologies of the Picturesque: British Art, Poetry, and Instruments, 1750–1830* (Lewisburg, PA: Bucknell University Press, 2008) esp., 81–129; W. J. T. Mitchell, ed., *Landscape and Power*, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

[22] Herman Melville, *Pierre; or, The Ambiguities*, ed. Harrison Hayford, Hershel Parker, and G. Thomas Tanselle (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1971), 289. Hereafter cited in text as *P*.

[23] "He knew not how it had got there or whence it had come though himself had closed his own grip upon it" (*P* 206).

[24] D. Graham Burnett, "Mapping Time: Chronometry on Top of the World," *Daedalus* 132, no. 2 (April 2003): 15.

[25] Michael D. Snediker, "*Pierre* and the Non-Transparencies of Figuration," *ELH* 77, no. 1 (2010): 224.

[26] Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1987), 422.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Gilles Deleuze, "Bartleby; or, The Formula," in *Essays Critical and Clinical*, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (London: Verso, 1998), 86.

[29] Massumi, *Parables of the Virtual*, 207. Many of Massumi's arguments regarding the process of sensation are based on the science of Benjamin Libet. Ruth Leys has critiqued both Massumi and Libet for how conclusions derived from these experiments reinforce a mind-body dichotomy. Leys also points to criticisms of Libet's experimental methods by other scientists. See Ruth Leys, "The Turn to Affect: A Critique," *Critical Inquiry* 37, no. 3 (March 2011): 434–72. doi:10.1086/659353.

[30] Quoted in Stanley Cavell, "What's the Use of Calling Emerson a Pragmatist?," in *Emerson's Transcendental Etudes*, ed. David Justin Hodge (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 216.

[31] Paul North, *The Problem of Distraction* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012), 7.

[32] Ibid., 15.

[33] Jonathan Crary, *24/7: Late Capitalism and the Ends of Sleep* (Brooklyn, NY: Verso, 2013), 88.

[34] Ibid., 88–89.

[35] Ibid., 23.